Trade liberalization, wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit‐constrained economy

Sushobhan Mahata (), Rohan Kanti Khan, Ranjanendra Narayan Nag and Sharmi Sen

Review of Development Economics, 2023, vol. 27, issue 4, 2183-2213

Abstract: The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two‐stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade‐off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.

Date: 2023
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