 Rent Extraction and Political Accountability: Evidence From Audit Impact in KenyaAntony Mbithi and Yoko Kijima Review of Development Economics, 2026, vol. 30, issue 1, 255-287 Abstract: Political accountability is an anchor to a well‐functioning democracy. Governments and bureaucrats accountable to their electorate abide by the rule of law. With information provision for better governance involving complex conditions, we investigate at what stage corruption information from public oversight institutions is successful in effecting political accountability. Using publicly released audit information on the newly established county governments in Kenya, outcomes of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) that initiate the implementation of audit queries, and a nationally representative survey, we find that individuals interviewed immediately after the release of corruption news perceive their county executives (governor's) to be corrupt and condemn local legislators' performance of oversight role. Also, local legislators with a high number of audit irregularities are less likely to run and win in the next elections. Our findings show that in an emerging democracy and developing country context, a symbiotic relationship between audit institutions and the PAC, as expected in a Westminster system, is needed, for one without the other cannot achieve its mandate. Date: 2026 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:30:y:2026:i:1:p:255-287 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Review of Development Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi More articles in Review of Development Economics from Wiley Blackwell |
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