EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Corporate Governance in India and Pakistan: Critical Macro‐Finance, Legal Origins, and Institutional Divergence

Scott M. Brown, Muhammad Zubair Mumtaz, Eric Powers and Zachary Smith

Review of Development Economics, 2026, vol. 30, issue 2, 882-893

Abstract: This paper examines institutional divergence between India and Pakistan using a comparative governance lens. By integrating Critical Macro‐Finance (CMF) theory with a FAIR data workflow, we construct a replicable model of corporate governance quality across fragile democratic contexts. While headline indices such as Ease of Doing Business (EoDB) suggest convergence, our findings reveal persistent and widening institutional asymmetries—especially in judicial independence, rule of law, and regulatory coherence. Our contribution is threefold: (1) we offer new comparative insights into how postcolonial governance regimes evolve under democratic strain; (2) we empirically model divergence in state and market institutions between two formally similar but functionally distinct economies; and (3) we introduce a scalable, transparent approach to modeling institutional risk using open‐source methods aligned with FAIR principles.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.70026

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:30:y:2026:i:2:p:882-893

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1363-6669

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Development Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi

More articles in Review of Development Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2026-04-07
Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:30:y:2026:i:2:p:882-893