Wage Determination of a Child Worker: A Theoretical Analysis

Manash Ranjan Gupta

Review of Development Economics, 2000, vol. 4, issue 2, 219-228

Abstract: A theory of wage determination of a child worker is presented using the consumption efficiency hypothesis and the Nash bargaining technique. The employer and the guardian of the child play the bargaining game. The model shows some interesting results regarding the split of the wage between the consumption of the child and the income of the guardian.

Date: 2000
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