Choices That Increase Compliance

Patrick Ronald Edwards

Review of Policy Research, 1991, vol. 10, issue 4, 6-27

Abstract: A compliance model is developed and tested using a survey of corporate officials and the regulatory arena of equal employment opportunity. Findings support the economic model of compliance in its conclusion that probability of detection and probable level of sanctions influence compliance decisions. Results also indicate that adjustments to the model that account for bounded rationality are valid. The key outcome, however, is that although all types of investigations play some role in enhancing compliance, those that stress sanctions and thus severity rather than certainty of detection may have the greatest positive influence on compliance. Enforcement programs attempting to operate simply as investigators of small‐scale complaints will have less success than those with different types of investigations or a balanced type of single investigation. The results also suggest a more complex cognitive process on the part of regulated individuals than initially theorized.

Date: 1991
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