Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Explanations

James C. Clingermayer and William F. West

Review of Policy Research, 1992, vol. 11, issue 2, 37-56

Abstract: Scholars have offered different explanations for administrative procedures. One general approach stresses the importance of normative theory as a determinant of institutional choice, while two other perspectives emphasize the interests and political influence of pressure groups and legislators. To test these models, this study uses comparative state data to predict the adoption of three types of administrative procedures‐legislative rule review, procedural requirements opening up the rulemaking process to public participation, and economic impact analysis. The findings suggest that factors associated with the adoption of one kind of administrative requirement may not be associated with the use of others. The analysis also suggests that, while ideology, political culture, and party competition intermittently affect the adoption of particular administrative procedures, they do not always have the kinds of effects that are suggested by the traditional state policy making literature.

Date: 1992
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.1992.tb00389.x

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