EXPLAINING FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY

Manabu Saeki and Steven A. Shull

Review of Policy Research, 2002, vol. 19, issue 2, 128-150

Abstract: In an examination of Federal Funds rate monthly from 1954 to 2000, we compare a model using presidential party as a compositional variable with a model using presidential party as an interactive variable. Federal Reserve monetary policy was found responsive to the economy, to business elites, and to political circumstances. However, these influences had different patterns depending upon presidential party. The Federal Reserve appears to act neither randomly nor in isolation. It is responsive to the economy and interest groups but a President's partisan preference is particularly influential in decisions on monetary policy.

Date: 2002
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