GRESHAM'S LAW: THE REGULATORY ANALOGY

C. K. Rowland and Roger Marz

Review of Policy Research, 1982, vol. 1, issue 3, 572-580

Abstract: The authors argue that delegation of discretion over environmental regulation to the states may trigger a process analogous to Gresham's Law in which lax regulation in one state drives out stringent regulation in neighboring states. This devolution to regulatory laxity is illustrated by the lax pesticide regulations in five Midwestern “agricultural” states. Questions are raised about the effects of the Reagan Administration's commitment to reduce the stringency of federal environmental regulations and delegate more regulatory discretion to the states.

Date: 1982
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