BUREAUCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF URBAN SERVICES: THE CASE OF TEAM POLICING1

Richard L. Petrick

Review of Policy Research, 1982, vol. 1, issue 3, 581-595

Abstract: Two extreme positions dominate the decentralization debate in urban politics: one school consistently opposes decentralization, while the other maintains that only complete radical community control can solve the problems of politics and administration in the city. Positions and policies between these two extremes tend to get lost in rhetoric and argument, or receive only passing recognition. This paper is an attempt to carve out, theoretically and empirically, some space for an intermediate position. Following a brief exploration of the decentralization debate, we discuss and present some analysis from a team policing experiment, a type of ecentralization that falls in between the two extremes. The data suggest that this type of decentralization can be successful if the program is designed as a non‐zero‐sum game, and the paper concludes that intermediate programs represent attractive third choices to discredited or unworkable alternatives.

Date: 1982
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