Regulatory competition, administrative discretion, and environmental policy implementation

Neal D. Woods

Review of Policy Research, 2022, vol. 39, issue 4, 486-511

Abstract: This study assesses what causes American states to assume the authority to administer federal environmental programs within their borders, rather than leave implementation to the Environmental Protection Agency. Some observers have argued that interstate competition for mobile capital may motivate states to seek this authority so that they may reduce the regulatory burdens imposed on industrial polluters. Other scholars highlight the importance of intrastate political and economic factors or vertical influences emanating from federal officials. I argue that the relative importance of each of these classes of explanations will vary across environmental policy arenas, depending on the amount of implementation discretion that federal programs provide to state agencies. Results from event history analyses of two major environmental programs are generally, though not entirely, consistent with this theory. 本文评估了是什么导致美国各州有权在其管辖范围内管理联邦环境计划，而不是让环境保护署执行计划。一些观察者认为，各州间对移动资本的争夺可能激励各州寻求这种管理权，以期减少对工业污染者施加的监管压力。其他学者强调了各州内的政治因素和经济因素或源自联邦官员的垂直影响。我论证认为，每一种解释的相对重要性将在环境政策领域中存在差异，这取决于联邦计划为各州政府机构提供的执行自由裁量权的多少。对两个重大的环境计划进行事件史分析，得出的结果大体上与该理论相一致。 Este estudio evalúa qué hace que los estados estadounidenses asuman la autoridad para administrar programas ambientales federales dentro de sus fronteras, en lugar de dejar la implementación a la Agencia de Protección Ambiental. Algunos observadores han argumentado que la competencia interestatal por el capital móvil puede motivar a los estados a buscar esta autoridad para reducir las cargas regulatorias impuestas a los contaminadores industriales. Otros académicos destacan la importancia de los factores políticos y económicos intraestatales o las influencias verticales que emanan de los funcionarios federales. Sostengo que la importancia relativa de cada una de estas clases de explicaciones variará en los ámbitos de la política ambiental, dependiendo de la cantidad de discrecionalidad de implementación que los programas federales brinden a las agencias estatales. Los resultados de los análisis de la historia de eventos de dos programas ambientales importantes son generalmente, aunque no del todo, consistentes con esta teoría.

Date: 2022
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