PRESIDENTIAL POLICY PREFERENCES AND SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT SUCCESS

John B. Gates and Jeffrey E. Cohen

Review of Policy Research, 1989, vol. 8, issue 4, 800-811

Abstract: Presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are major constitutional events. Few studies assess whether this political process benefits presidents with appointment opportunities. This article estimates the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in appointing favorable justices on the racial equality issues. Previous research uses the president's party affiliation as an indirect measure of presidential preferences. This research examines the president's policy stance more directly by using presidential public statements on racial equality issues. An issue specific measure of presidential preferences shows that presidents have been more successful in appointing like‐minded justices than reliance on presidential party would suggest. Regression estimates of the justices aggregate voting record on racial equality cases are robust even in light of other controls. The implications for democratic theory and future research are discussed.

Date: 1989
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.1989.tb00996.x

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