INTERNAL COMPETITION OVER FOREIGN POLICY‐MAKING: THE CASE OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO IRAN

D. Bruce Hicks

Review of Policy Research, 1990, vol. 9, issue 3, 471-484

Abstract: Two models of foreign‐policy making, the bureaucratic politics model and the royal court model, are helpful in explaining U.S. arms sales to Iran in 1985 and in 1986. The bureaucratic politics model is particularly useful in clarifying both the positions taken by the leaders of the foreign policy bureaucracy to the arms sales proposals and the behavior of these officials as the sales were implemented. However, the royal court model best ac‐ counts for the decisive role of the president and the deference given to those advisers perceived to be acting in his interests.

Date: 1990
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