Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy‐making and Politics

Gulcin Ozkan

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 102, issue 4, 621-643

Abstract: The costs and benefits of cooperative monetary and fiscal policy are analysed in the framework of a partisan business‐cycles model. It is shown that political parties with different ideologies prefer to choose different arrangements for macroeconomic policy‐making. More specifically, right‐wing parties favour independent central banks more than left‐wing parties. An independent central bank is also the generally preferred option from a social welfare point of view. In addition, the form of policy‐making arrangements between the fiscal and monetary authorities is shown to influence the extent of partisan cycles. JEL classification: E32; E58; E63; C72

Date: 2000
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