Social Insurance with In‐kind Provision of Private Goods

Dan Anderberg

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 103, issue 1, 41-61

Abstract: This paper addresses the desirability of providing in‐kind transfers as a screening device to facilitate redistribution of income from able to disabled persons within a social insurance system. An optimal policy—consisting of cash transfers, income‐contingent in‐kind transfers of one good particularly demanded by disabled workers, and linear taxation of other commodities—is characterized. It is then asked whether and, if so, when this policy can be replaced by an “earning‐tested scheme” that provides the in‐kind good only to those indivi duals who have no earnings from labor or by a non‐linear pricing policy.

Date: 2001
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