Is Environmental Dumping Greater when Plants are Footloose?

Alistair Ulph and Laura Valentini

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 103, issue 4, 673-688

Abstract: We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non‐cooperative governments for two different move structures—where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game. JEL classification F1; H4; L5; Q2

Date: 2001
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