Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

Anastasios Xepapadeas

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 107, issue 3, 583-599

Abstract: The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long‐run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non‐cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00424.x

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