Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption

Roger Myerson

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 108, issue 4, 727-742

Abstract: The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single‐winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.

Date: 2006
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