An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem

Jean-François Laslier and Jörgen Weibull

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 115, issue 1, 84-108

Abstract: We consider a group of individuals who face a binary collective decision. Each group member holds some private information, and all agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown, and members can differ in their valuations of the two types of mistakes that might occur, and in their prior beliefs about the true state. For a slightly randomized majority rule, we show that informative voting by all voters is the unique Nash equilibrium, that this equilibrium is strict, and that the Condorcet asymptotic efficiency result holds in this setting.

Date: 2013
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01734.x

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Working Paper: An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem (2013)
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