Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting
Alessandro Bucciol (),
Natalia Montinari () and
Marco Piovesan ()
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2015, vol. 117, issue 4, 1204-1229
In this paper, we examine whether combining non-monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999–2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase the sorted-to-total waste ratio by 17 percent, and that their effect reinforces that of a door-to-door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7 percent. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated with both PAYT and DtD.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting (2011)
Working Paper: Do not Trash the Incentive! Monetary incentives and waste sorting (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:117:y:2015:i:4:p:1204-1229
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520
Access Statistics for this article
Scandinavian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Richard Friberg, Matti Liski and Kjetil Storesletten
More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().