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Private Information in Life Insurance, Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets

Amelie Wuppermann

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2017, vol. 119, issue 4, 855-881

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.

Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Private information in life insurance, annuity and health insurance markets (2014) Downloads
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