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Single‐Party Rule, Public Spending, and Political Rents: Evidence from Finnish Municipalities

Jaakko Meriläinen ()

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 121, issue 2, 736-762

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the differences in public spending and extraction of political rents between single‐party and coalition governments. Common pool theories predict that coalitions tend to spend more and extract more rents than single‐party governments. Using data from Finnish municipalities for the years 1997–2012 and a regression discontinuity design approach tailored for proportional elections, I provide causal evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Date: 2019
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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:121:y:2019:i:2:p:736-762