Optimal Dynamic Taxation with Distinctive Forms of Social Status Attainment

Juin-jen Chang, Hsueh‐Fang Tsai and Tsung‐Sheng Tsai
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tsung-Sheng Tsai ()

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2019, vol. 121, issue 2, 808-842

Abstract: We examine the role of both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons in setting dynamic optimal income taxation. Under complete information, state‐invariant labor income taxes are used to remedy the externality caused by consumption‐induced social comparisons, while state‐contingent capital income taxes are used to remedy the externalities caused by both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons. Under incomplete information, distinct types of agents are subject to an identical marginal capital income tax, which removes social comparisons. To solve the information problem, low‐productivity agents could be subject to a lower marginal labor tax than high‐productivity agents, which contradicts the traditional result in the Mirrlees–Stiglitz models.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:121:y:2019:i:2:p:808-842

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