Tax Enforcement Problems

Francisco Marhuenda () and Ignacio Ortuño‐Ortín
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ignacio Ortuno Ortin

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 99, issue 1, 61-72

Abstract: We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal‐agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00047

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:1:p:61-72

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520

Access Statistics for this article

Scandinavian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Richard Friberg, Matti Liski and Kjetil Storesletten

More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().