On Choosing Organizational-Arrangements: The Example of Offshore Oil Gathering

Paul Hallwood

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1991, vol. 38, issue 3, 227-41

Abstract: The main organizational arrangements found in offshore oil production are described and explained using the transaction cost paradigm. Both measurement cost and rent appropriation economizing are utilized and it is shown that organizational arrangements align with predictions. The internationalization of the industry is shown to depend upon transaction cost economizing motives. Selection of an institutional market arrangement--the invited tender-bid auction--is also shown to be transaction cost dependent. Complexity of product or process is argued to be a separate explanatory variable in the choice of organizational arrangements. Copyright 1991 by Scottish Economic Society.

Date: 1991
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Scottish Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by Tim Barmby, Andrew Hughes-Hallett and Campbell Leith

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