Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views

Donato Masciandaro () and Franco Spinelli

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1994, vol. 41, issue 4, 434-43

Abstract: Over the last few years, it has been shown that the institutional constraints on central banks' behavior matter a lot. This paper supplements the existing literature by supplying a detailed listing and an appropriate grouping of the many constraints that have been considered so far; a ranking of all central banks of OECD countries according to their degrees of independence of governments; and the results of an inquiry into the relevance that central bankers themselves attach to such matters. Copyright 1994 by Scottish Economic Society.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:41:y:1994:i:4:p:434-43

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