The Price-Quality Relationship under Monopoly and Competition

Donald A R George

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1996, vol. 43, issue 1, 99-112

Abstract: Screening and signalling models have both been used to analyze the price-quality relationship. Both types of model have their shortcomings. An alternative approach is presented which involves endogenizing the quality control process. Firms voluntarily provide a warranty contract for their products and this, in turn, generates an incentive to control quality. Monopolistic and competitive markets are compared in respect of warranties, quality control, and the price-quality relationship. Copyright 1996 by Scottish Economic Society.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:43:y:1996:i:1:p:99-112

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0036-9292

Access Statistics for this article

Scottish Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by Tim Barmby, Andrew Hughes-Hallett and Campbell Leith

More articles in Scottish Journal of Political Economy from Scottish Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().