Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game

Sara De la Rica and Maria Paz Espinosa

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 44, issue 2, 134-152

Abstract: This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions.

Date: 1997
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9485.00049

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Working Paper: Testing Employment determination in Unionised Economices as a Repeated Gam e (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:44:y:1997:i:2:p:134-152

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