Endogenous effort in a Dynamic Model of Union–Firm Interaction

>Sudeshna Champati Bandyopadhyay

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1997, vol. 44, issue 3, 280-297

Abstract: This paper studies the implications of union deviation by reducing effort in the context of a repeated game model. We find that a failure to account for the possibility of union deviation may lead to an overestimation of the possibility of cooperation. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that unions may reach the efficient outcome despite wage hikes because they work harder under cooperation. We also find that when effort is an endogenous variable, the cooperative wage is likely to be higher than otherwise. Finally, our model predicts that if the union alone deviates, effort will fall as the endgame approaches. However, wages could either rise or fall.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9485.00058

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:44:y:1997:i:3:p:280-297

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0036-9292

Access Statistics for this article

Scottish Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by Tim Barmby, Andrew Hughes-Hallett and Campbell Leith

More articles in Scottish Journal of Political Economy from Scottish Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().