The Behaviour of the Firm under Alternative Regulatory Constraints

Philip Burns, Ralph Turvey and Thomas G. Weyman‐Jones

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1998, vol. 45, issue 2, 133-157

Abstract: We review the case for intermediate power incentive regulation such as sliding scale when the regulator is badly informed and the firm's profits have a shadow resource cost. We then evaluate a number of different regulatory regimes including sliding scale in terms of productive and allocative efficiency. We find that the sliding scale principle can be applied quite generally—to dividends, profits or rate of return and that it has attractive economic properties.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:45:y:1998:i:2:p:133-157

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