An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict

Colin Jennings

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1998, vol. 45, issue 3, 294-308

Abstract: Tullock (1971) demonstrated that the causes of political rebellion are perhaps more to do with private expected utility than collective discontent. There is much to suggest that pecuniary motivation plays a large part in the Northern Ireland (NI) conflict given the substantial amount of ‘black market’ activity which is present. This paper therefore puts forward an economic model of the NI paramilitaries blending their gangster and political activities which are commonly geared to earn revenue. From this model an explanation from an economic perspective emerges as to why a cease‐fire may occur and why it is unstable. The implications of the model are then investigated, with particular reference to conflict solutions arising from the economic model rather than political diplomacy.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict (1996)
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