The Evolution of European Central Bank Independence: An Updating of the Masciandaro and Spinelli Index

Henry Tavelli, Giuseppe Tullio and Franco Spinelli

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1998, vol. 45, issue 3, 341-344

Abstract: In an earlier paper in this journal, Masciandaro and Spinelli computed an index of central bank independence for a number of countries on the basis of the institutional arrangements in place in 1990. Since then the situation has changed and therefore that work needs an updating. This shows that the Bundesbank remains the most independent central bank, but several other central banks have increased their independence: see the cases of Spain, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Great Britain. The Bank of Spain has registered the biggest improvement and the Bank of Portugal remains the least independent.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:341-344

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