A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank (1948-1973)
Helge Berger () and
Jakob de Haan ()
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1999, vol. 46, issue 1, 17-39
This paper analyzes certain periods in the history of the Bundesbank, concentrating on the determinants of central bank independence as suggested in the literature. The authors concluded that some determinants outlined in the literature (like popular backing) played a role in the making of the Bundesbank Law of 1957. Their analysis of the conflicts between the Bundesbank and the federal government over monetary policy suggest that, if a conflict concerned interest rate policy, the Bundesbank always got its way. Even with respect to exchange rate policy the Bundesbank often prevailed. The paper also provides ample evidence of coordination problems with fiscal policy. Copyright 1999 by Scottish Economic Society.
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