Prices and Information Under Imperfect Competition

Torben M. Andersen and Morten Hviid

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1999, vol. 46, issue 3, 245-259

Abstract: Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being adjusted to all available information or to adjusted but biased prices.

Date: 1999
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