 MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, SUPERVISION AND EMPLOYEE DISCRETIONKevin Amess (), Sarah Brown () and Steve Thompson Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2007, vol. 54, issue 4, 447-474 Abstract: Using a matched sample of 1959 firms and 27,263 employees from the UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey, we examine the effects of the management buyout (MBO) organizational form on employee discretion and supervision. Our findings suggest that for MBO firms, supervision is lower where there is a higher proportion of craft and skilled service workers but is not lower for other occupational groups. Using random effects ordered probit analysis, we find that employees' discretion over their work practices is higher in MBO firms; and that the probability of higher discretion is greater where there is a higher proportion of craft and skilled service employees. Our findings are consistent with: (i) MBOs reducing hierarchical tiers and the number of supervisory staff, which increase employees' span of control and their discretion; and (ii) organizational change via an MBO being ‘skill biased’ in favour of craft and skilled service employees. Date: 2007 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:54:y:2007:i:4:p:447-474 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Scottish Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by Tim Barmby, Andrew Hughes-Hallett and Campbell Leith More articles in Scottish Journal of Political Economy from Scottish Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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