Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions

Bryan McCannon

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 65, issue 1, 68-96

Abstract: Results from a leader–follower public goods game are presented. An individual, when randomly selected to make a contribution knowing others will observe the selection, gives more than in the simultaneous†move public goods game. Followers adopt a quasi†matching strategy where they systematically donate less than the leader, but contribute more when the leader does and contribute less when the leader free rides. The net result is increased provision of a public good when contributions are sequential. The results highlight that psychological preferences, rather than solely social preferences, can explain behavior.

Date: 2018
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