The Political Economy of Reforming the Anti‐dumping Laws

Robert Baldwin

The World Economy, 2005, vol. 28, issue 5, 745-747

Abstract: In the idealised economic world in which economists usually begin their theoretical analyses, the first‐best international policy for dealing with dumping is to eliminate the economic distortions that make dumping possible, e.g., tariffs, subsidies and monopoly power, and deal with relevant equity considerations through lump‐sum income redistribution. But this combination of policies generally is not politically feasible, and the use of second‐best policies is the only realistic option. Consequently, for academic economists seeking achievable AD reform, the most promising approach may be to work toward the elimination of the many current administrative practices that unfairly injure groups not directly involved in the petitioning process but accept that there can be practical circumstances where the equity concerns of petitioners trump overall efficiency objectives.

Date: 2005
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