Political Repression and Child Labour: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Alessandro Maffei, Nikolai Raabe and Heinrich Ursprung

The World Economy, 2006, vol. 29, issue 2, 211-239

Abstract: Most normative studies on child labour arrive at the conclusion that child labour is detrimental to social welfare. Child labour is, however, still prevalent in many developing countries even though in many of these countries it is forbidden by law. In this paper we develop a political‐economic model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labour legislation. The most important implication of our model is that in countries with repressive political regimes enforcement is more lenient and child labour thus more prevalent than in countries enjoying political freedom. We test this implication and find that it is confirmed by the data.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00778.x

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Working Paper: Political Repression and Child Labor: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:worlde:v:29:y:2006:i:2:p:211-239

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