How do countries respond to anti†dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti†dumping

Robert Feinberg and Kara Reynolds

The World Economy, 2018, vol. 41, issue 5, 1251-1268

Abstract: Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti†dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti†dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti†dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti†dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti†dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.

Date: 2018
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