Steel, security and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A trade catastrophe in the making

Kenneth A. Reinert

The World Economy, 2024, vol. 47, issue 6, 2741-2759

Abstract: The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Dispute Settlement Mechanism has been rendered ineffective by the refusal of the United States to allow appointments to its Appellate Body. The implicit reason for this poor state of affairs is the desire of the United States to protect its steel sector under the WTO's national security exception. The arguments made by the United States in this regard are mostly spurious and reflect its status as a current bad faith actor within the WTO. The posture of the United States is undermining both the effectiveness and legitimacy of this important trade institution. This article examines both the events leading up to this situation, the commercial interests behind them, and their legitimacy under WTO law.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13556

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:worlde:v:47:y:2024:i:6:p:2741-2759

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0378-5920

Access Statistics for this article

The World Economy is currently edited by David Greenaway

More articles in The World Economy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().