Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets

Sadettin Çitçi

BIFEC Book of Abstracts & Proceedings, 2014, vol. 1, issue 2, 110-120

Abstract: We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability.

Keywords: Transparency; career concern; delegated portfolio management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G32 J33 L21 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bor:bifeca:v:1:y:2014:i:2:p:110-120

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