Bureaucrats' processing of organizational reputation signals
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and
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Sharon Gilad: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Michaela Assouline: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & The National Social Security Institute
Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, 2018, vol. 1, issue 1
Notwithstanding the significance of a positive bureaucratic reputation, the average bureau functions amidst deep-rooted public hostility. Bureaucracy bashing presumably weakens public sector employees’ commitment to their bureaus, which is known to undermine public sector performance. Motivated by these concerns, this paper investigates whether exogenous signals regarding a bureau’s reputation affect the organizational attachment – identification and commitment – of its employees, and the variation in employee responses. Employing an experiment at an Israeli welfare bureaucracy, we show that the organizational attachment of employees who feel central and influential within the bureau is unshaken, and even reinforced, in response to negative reputation signals. Conversely, employees who feel marginal and powerless are receptive to both negative and positive reputation signals. The implications of these findings are that public organizations can buffer their employees from the detrimental effects of negative reputation signals, yet by so doing they may shut out justified scrutiny and demands for change.
Keywords: Bureaucratic reputation; Reputation signals; Organizational identification; Organizational commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J28 Z00 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpd:articl:v:1:y:2018:i:1:jbpa.11.11
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