Executive Pay and Labor’s Shares: Unions and Corporate Governance from Enron to Dodd-Frank

Jacoby Sanford M. ()
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Jacoby Sanford M.: Management History and Public Affairs, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2020, vol. 10, issue 3, 48

Abstract: This article is an historical analysis of the U.S. labor movement’s shareholder activism during the 2000s, which was based on their pension-plan assets. During the previous decade, corporate governance had tilted to give shareholders greater voice in corporate decisions. The protagonists were public pension plans such as CalPERS. Come the 2000s, they were replaced by unions and union-influenced pension plans. Their agendas overlapped but union investors were distinctive in their use of shareholder activism to make companies more public-minded, raise labor’s organizing power, and challenge executive power by reliance not only on shareholder activism but also political activities. Labor’s signature issue was executive pay, which was a topic that that shareholder activists during the 1990s had avoided other than to push for stock-based pay. But three waves of corporate scandals during the following decade caused other shareholders to become skeptical of executive pay-setting methods. Union investors zeroed in on expensing and backdating of stock options, and fought for say on pay, the issue where they had the greatest impact. An interaction between private orderings and regulation now developed, whereby shareholder pay reforms found their way into law. With inequality a major social concern, unions repeatedly contrasted lofty executive pay to stagnant wages. Yet little was said about lofty payouts to shareholders, which may have been a more important driver of inequality than executive pay. The article ties corporate governance to larger social and political developments in the U.S., and to the labor movement, embedding corporate governance in historical context.

Keywords: corporate governance; executive compensation; labor unions; say on pay; Dodd-Frank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2019-0073

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