Unreliable Accounts: How Regulators Fabricate Conceptual Narratives to Diffuse Criticism

Ramanna Karthik ()
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Ramanna Karthik: Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2022, vol. 12, issue 2, 81-151

Abstract: In 2010, the U.S. accounting rulemaker (FASB) updated its longstanding constitution to eliminate “reliability” as a fundamental accounting property. FASB argued that “reliability” was misunderstood in practice and that this amendment clarified its original intent. Drawing on primary archival resources and field interviews with regulators, I provide evidence that the change also sought to legitimize the rise of fair-value accounting. By eliminating the need for accounting to be “reliable,” the change attempted to neutralize concerns about the subjectivity in fair-value estimates. Such subjectivity can facilitate accounting manipulation, and some fair-value rules can be attributed to lobbying by managers who stand to benefit. The change illustrates “conceptual veiling,” wherein regulators, seeking to diffuse criticism, including suspicions of capture, manufacture costly conceptual narratives for justifying their actions.

Keywords: capital markets; fair-value accounting; FASB; regulatory capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G18 K22 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2021-0002

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