The Interplay Between Tax Havens, Geographic Disclosures and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from European Union

Kobbi-Fakhfakh Sameh ()
Additional contact information
Kobbi-Fakhfakh Sameh: Research Unit: URAMEF, Department of Accounting and Law, High Business School of Sfax, Sfax University, Sfax, Tunisia

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2023, vol. 13, issue 4, 417-456

Abstract: This study examines the interplay between tax haven use, geographic disclosures and corporate tax avoidance. Based on a panel of 497 non-financial EU listed firms during the period 2006–2012, we provide evidence that corporate groups with affiliates in tax havens tend to have lower effective tax rates and lower geographic disclosures fineness scores. We, also, find a positive association between geographic disclosures fineness scores and the firms’ effective tax rates. We, further, find that the negative association between tax haven use and the effective tax rate is more pronounced for firms disclosing geographic information at a more aggregated level, showing a moderating effect of geographic disclosures fineness on such association. Our findings are based upon hand-collected data on corporate geographical dispersion, and corroborated by several additional and robustness tests. The research results should be of concern to policymakers and others interested in multinational companies’ segment reporting practices and tax planning activities.

Keywords: tax havens; geographic disclosures fineness; aggregation level; corporate tax avoidance; tax burden; effective tax rate; country-by-country reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H H2 M (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2021-0008 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:13:y:2023:i:4:p:417-456:n:1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ael/html

DOI: 10.1515/ael-2021-0008

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium is currently edited by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yuri Biondi and Shyam Sunder

More articles in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().