The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies

Eric Monnet

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, 431-456

Abstract: This article provides a framework for understanding the economic role of central banks and their democratic legitimacy. I argue that thinking about the democratic challenges of central banking requires considering central banks’ insurance role and how their actions are part of credit policy. The contract between the central bank and the sovereign is incomplete because it cannot integrate all unforeseen contingencies, distributive consequences and interactions with other policies. This opens the door to viewing the legitimacy of central bank decisions through a process of deliberation, coordination and reflexivity, rather than only a delegation of power. I discuss a proposal for a European Credit Council, which would be a deliberative body aimed at strengthening Parliamentary power on monetary and credit policies, the democratic legitimacy of central bank policy in the Euro Area as well as its coordination with other European policies. More coordination, Parliamentary power and deliberation are consistent with central bank independence and aim to delimit more precisely the action of central banks within the macroeconomic and credit policies of the State.

Keywords: central banking; credit policy; monetary policy; deliberative democracy; welfare state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E4 E5 G2 H8 O2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:14:y:2024:i:4:p:431-456:n:1007

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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0113

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