The Power of Coordination and Deliberation

Eric Monnet

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, 553-562

Abstract: I provide comments and replies to the seven insightful contributions that discussed “The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies” and the proposal for a European Credit Council. I review how interdisciplinary scholarship on the political economy of central banking have shown the limits of simple principal-agent framework applied to central bank power and legitimacy. I emphasize why a change to central bank independence is not necessary for a fundamental change in the financial system and credit policies. I also argue that deliberations can have strong effects on decision-making and that the power of the people is not restricted to the legislative power.

Keywords: central banking; monetary policy; credit policy; deliberative democracy; central bank independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E4 E5 G2 H8 O2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0114

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