Remuneration of Non-Executive Directors in German Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis from a Practitioners’ Perspective

Lazar Christian (), Metzner Yves (), Rapp Marc Steffen () and Wolff Michael ()
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Lazar Christian: Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany
Metzner Yves: Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany
Rapp Marc Steffen: Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany
Wolff Michael: Faculty of Economic Sciences, Universtiy of Göttingen, Göttingen Germany

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2013, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: We analyze director compensation in German listed firms for the 2005–2009 period. Our sample covers all listed companies in the German Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, specifically firms with shares listed in the indices of DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX. In the last years, non-executive directors are facing increasing duties and (legal) responsibilities. From that perspective, it is quite surprising that the remuneration of non-executive directors has received rather little attention so far. In this study, we examine the German experience. We present the status quo of non-executive director remuneration and discuss its challenges. Specifically, we will look at the level of director remuneration and the (possible) problem of limited incentives.

Keywords: varieties of corporate governance; Germany; director compensation; stock options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2013-0014

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