The “Comply or Explain” Approach as a Pascalian Wager

Duhamel Jean-Christophe ()
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Duhamel Jean-Christophe: Faculty of Law, University Lille 2, Lille/North of France

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2015, vol. 5, issue 3, 289-293

Abstract: This article is a short comment on Mr Sergakis’ article: “Deconstruction and reconstruction of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in EU capital markets”. It deals about the possibility for the comply or explain to be anything else than “one concept fits all”, and especially, wonders if the improvement of such a disclosure device might influence the modification of companies’ and investors’ behaviours in favour of long-termism and dialogue.

Keywords: corporate governance; comply or explain; corporate disclosures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:5:y:2015:i:3:p:289-293:n:2

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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2014-0021

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