Power of Inaction or Ability to Learn in Action within a Political Process? Comments on “The Power of Inaction” by Cornelia Woll

Moutot Philippe ()
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Moutot Philippe: Department of Economics, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Hessen, Germany

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2016, vol. 6, issue 1, 47-56

Abstract: How to best describe and assess the result of a bailout process? The author argues that the power of inaction of banks while relevant, as argued by Cornelia Woll in her book, is not sufficient to characterize the result of a bailout process. As such result should encompass financial stability and business cycle considerations, the power of inaction of banks needs to be viewed in combination with the ability of authorities to learn in action and the quality of the legal and political process that accompanies such learning.

Keywords: bail-outs; financial crisis; treasury-finance nexus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2015-0009

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