Comment on The Power of Inaction by Cornelia Woll

Jensen Jason O. ()
Additional contact information
Jensen Jason O.: Department of Sociology, McGill University, Room 712, Leacock Building 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Quebec H2X 1W4, Canada

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2016, vol. 6, issue 1, 65-78

Abstract: This comment presents three arguments. First, that while The Power of Inaction focuses on the role of banks within bailout negotiations, this framework can be gainfully expanded by considering the government side of the bailout negotiations: evidence from the U.S. and German cases suggests that the government, as well as banks, can wield the threat of inaction in a bailout negotiation. Second, that coordinated interventions were implemented in countries where the largest leading banks were weak, and vice versa. As this singularly determines the type of intervention, it leaves little room for making strong inferences on other factors. Third, that Woll’s study indicated that coordinated interventions are more cost-efficient than uncoordinated interventions. An unexplored implication is that government negotiators can gainfully persuade banks to take part in a coordinated intervention.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2015-0010 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:6:y:2016:i:1:p:65-78:n:2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ael/html

DOI: 10.1515/ael-2015-0010

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium is currently edited by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yuri Biondi and Shyam Sunder

More articles in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().